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High-Tech Lending: Maintaining
Priority in an Intangible World
R. Marc Mercier* and Richard A. Haigh**
Financing intangible intellectual property in Canada presents some novel demands on
lenders because ofthe interaction ofprovincial security schemes withfederal intellectual
property legislation. This article looks at the relative ease with which security interests
in intangible property may be obtained under provincial personal property security
regimes, and then at the various federal intellectual property statutes. which exhibit
more (~la piecemeal approach to financing. In addition, a number (~l constitutional
issues arise because of this jurisdictional split, and the article e.tplores these issues,
comparing the situation in Canada with that in the United States. The article suggests
that unless legislatire reform occurs, a cautious and pragmatic approach to securing
intangible assets in Canada is warranted.

lejlnancement de la propriere intel!ectuelle au Canada pose des problemesparticuliers
aux preteurs en raison de !'interaction entre !es legislations federate et provinciales.
l 'article souligne la relative facilite avec laquelle ii est possible decreer une st'irete sur
!es biens incorporels en vertu des lois provinciales, a/ors qu 'au niveau federal, la
disparite des lois regissant la propriete intellectuelle commande des approches distinctes. Plusieurs questions de droit constitutionnel se sou/event; !'article /es explore et
etab lit une comparaison avec la situation prevalant aux Etats-Unis. Tant qu 'une reforme
legislative ne prendra pas place, une attitude prudente et pragmatique s'impose pour
ce qui regarde la creation de st'iretes dans ce domaine au Canada.

Partner, Fraser Milner, Toronto.
Lecturer/Research Fellow, Deakin University, Melbourne.
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INTRODUCTION
The world of today is far different than the world of the mid-nineteenth
century. Personal computers, laser printers. facsimile machines. men walking on
the moon, were then unheard of. Today. the words of Francis Thompson, althc~ugh
written in another context are apt:
0 world inl'isib/e we view 1hee.
0 H'or!d intangible we touch lhee,
0 world unknowable. we know thee,
lnapprehensible, WP l'l111ch thee.
Although some may view my decision on this point as extreme temerity, l
am nevertheless convinced that the growth of the common law should not be
impeded by the dead hand of a mid-nineteenth century judge.'

Canada's economy, like that of most industrialized nations, is becoming more and more one based on information. The research, development and ultimate sale of intellectual property are now significant
aspects of trade and business around the globe. High-technology 2 companies operating in Canada, particularly those in the telecommunications, computer and biotechnology industries, will necessarily play a
strong role in the Canadian economy for many years to come. Unfortunately, most of these companies have few tangible assets on which to
rely for financing, making traditional lenders uneasy. As a result, adequate collateralization of intellectual and other "intangible" forms of
property is now a pressing issue for creditors.
The underlying theme of this aiticle is that lenders should not be
reluctant to provide financing to Canadian high-technology companies.
While institutional lending in this environment is not simple, solutions
- some more creative than others - do exist. Even though many of
the informational and intellectual assets of businesses in this age are
intangible, legal and financial structures are available that allow le!lders
to obtain the security they require.
This article addresses some of the more significant issues that face
Canadian lenders in taking security over the assets of high-technology
Carter D.C.J .. Planet Earlh Productions Inc. v. Rowlands ( 1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th)
715 (Ont. H.C.), at 726 ("Planet Earth").
To provide a meaningful definition of ''high technology" is not a simple task. It is
probably a term of art that defies concise definition. For the purposes of this article,
all references to ''high technology" will be roughly equated with intensive research,
development and ultimate sale of new and innovative products. processes and technologies. For an expanded but nevertheless incomplete definition, see D. W. Lentz
"Financing High-Technology: Congress Invests ir: a Retter Idea" ( 1982), 9 Rutgers
Comp. & Tech. L.J. 209, at n. I.
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finns, by providing a legal and practical overview of the principal means
for obtaining security interests in intellectual and other "intangible"
forms of prope11y. The article is broken down into five parts. The first
part provides an overview of various forms of intellectual property. The
second part examines how lenders can perfect security interests in and
achieve priority over intellectual and intangible prope11y under personal
property security legislation. 3 The third and fourth parts look at the
federal intellectual property legislation and the jurisdictional impact that
that legislation has on the taking of security in intellectual property. The
article concludes by reiterating the need for caution and due diligence,
and outlining suggested areas for legislative reform. Due to space limitations, the a11icle will not address the enforcement of security interests
or issues of priority, other than in the constitutional context.

2.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER PROPERTY
INTERESTS

(a)

Introduction

One of the most basic of secured lending principles is that lenders
should know and understand their borrowers. An integral part of any
such analysis requires lenders to determine, with great precision, what
assets a boJTower has and will be required to furnish as security. Most
of the assets owned by high-technology companies are inherently intangible and, as such, cannot be classified as readily as more traditional
tangible assets. Nevertheless, each of the key types of property in this
area may be the proper subject-matter of a security interest.
The most common forms of intellectual property include patents,
copyrights, trade-marks and industrial designs, each of which will be
Eight Canadian provinces and one tcITitory have each enacted personal property
security legislation: Alberta: S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05; British Columbia: R.S.B.C. 1996,
c. 359; Manitoba: R.S.M. 1987. c. P-35; New Brunswick: S.N.B. 1993, c. P-7.1;
Nova Scotia: S.N.S. 1995-96. c. J3; Ontario: R.S.O. 1990, c. P. I 0; Prince Edward
Island: S.P.E.I. J 997. c. 3: Saskatchewan: S.S. 1993. c. P-6.2; and Yukon Territory:
R.S. Y. 1986, c. 130. Notwithstanding that the rules governing movable hypothecs
contained in the Civil Code of Quebec. S.Q. 1991, c. 64, reflect traditional civil law
conceptual structure and legal style in the private law context. much of the substance
will be familiar to lawyers practising in personal property security jurisdictions. The
Civil Code of Quebec brings Quebec more in line with other systems in North
America. The Northwest Territories and Newfoundland are expected to implement
similar regimes in due course. Unless otherwise noted, all references in this article
arc to the Ontario Personal Property Security Act ( · 'PPSA' ').
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dealt with separately below. 4 Canada now also has specific legislation
dealing with integrated circuits, which are a special form of intellectual
property. 5 However, other assets also play a vital role in high-technology
industries, such as contractual rights and licences of hi(rh-technology
"'
~
products like computer applications. All are equally capable of being
collateralized. The following is a brief review of some of the more
significant of these assets. In later parts, we extend the analysis to
examine how various forms of security differ depending on the type of
asset.

(b)

Patents

Patents protect the essential technical elements of high technology,
such as computer algorithms and organizational structures incorporating
new ideas and new processes. The Patent Act protects those who have
made significant investments of time and money in developing an invention from the activities of others who may simply copy the patented
subject-matter without expending any of the costs associated with the
required research and development. The protection only accrues on the
registration of a patent. Before a patent may be issued in relation to a
pa1ticular invention, it must meet the requirements of eligibility defined
in the Patent Act. 7 The tests of novelty, utility, non-obviousness and

"
7
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Although not forming part of this article, it is important to note that other forms of
property arc often included within the rubric of intellectual property and that these
forms may hold significant value for lenders. For example. Parliament has enacted
the Plam Breeders· Rights Act. S.C. l 990, c. 20 to protect the proprietary interests
of breeders of new plant varieties. Likewise, trade secrets and other confidential
information often find their way into intellectual property discussions. which are
governed hy common law principks rather than by statute. Trade secrcls consist
largely of information (hut also formulas, patterns and devices) used by a business
in such a way that it gains advantage over competitors who do not know or do not
use it: Rimes v. Club Cmp. r~f America, 542 S.W. (2d) 909 (Tex. Civ. App.), at 9 I 3.
Lenders should be aware that there may be exigible proprietary value in such confidential informalion. even though the Supreme Court of Canada has expressed doubt
whether this might be the case: see R. v. Stewart. [I 988] I S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R.
(4th) I. S1ewar1 was decided in a criminal context, however. and it is probable that
trade secrets in the civil context are sufficiently proprietary so as to constitute personal
property.
Sec sec. 2(1), '"Integrated Circuits". inji·a.
R.S.C. l 985, c. P-4 ("Patent Act"). Canada first enacted the Patent Act in 1869
(S.C. 1869, c. 11 ).
Ibid., s. 27( I).
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inventiveness must be satisfied in order for a particular "invention" to
be patentable. 8 The Patent Act grants to successful applicants "the exclusive privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be used. " 9
Patents are a monopoly right created by statute; there is no common
law right to patent protection. 10 The monopoly gives owners broad rights
that can be very lucrative. Owners may choose to exploit a patent grant
directly by selling the patented good to the public on an ongoing basis,
or indirectly by agreeing to assign or license a third party to use the
patent. Either way, the owner of the patent may derive significant income
from use of the patent. The amount of income is related to the period of
exclusivity granted under the legislative monopoly - clearly, the inherent worth of the product and the exclusivity period determine the
value of a patent as security.
(c)

Copyright

The Copyright Ad 1 protects works of authorship, whether literary
or artistic, that are affixed to or set out on a particular medium. Copyright
protection is not afforded to ideas, but is given to ideas that ultimately
are expressed physically. In this way, copyright controls the proliferation
and reproduction of ideas in a tangible form. Physical manifestation of
a copyrighted work may be expressed on paper (for example, in lyrics
for music and screen plays) and, most important in the high-technology
environment, in computer programs. 12 Copyright gives to the owner the
An "invention" is defined in the Patent Act at s. 2 as ''any new and useful art,
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter" or any new and useful
improvement in relation to any of these.
'' Ibid., s. 42. Patents granted pursuant to an application filed after 30 September l 989
enjoy exclusive protection under the legislation for a period of 20 years from the
date of filing, as Jong as yearly maintenance fees arc paid. A patent will lapse if the
holders fail to keep maintenance fees current. Patents filed prior to I October 1989,
have an exclusive protection period of 17 years from the date the patent was granted.
See ss. 44-45 of the Patent Act.
w 22050 Farbwerke Hoeschst AG Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Canada
(Commissioner of Patents). [ 1964) S.C.R. 49 at 57, 25 Fox Pat. C. 99, 41 C.P.R. 9.
11
R.S.C. l 985, c. C-42 ("Copyright Act").
12
A computer program is generally a planned set of instrnctions that operate the
machinery of a computer or computer system. The Copyright Act has been revised
so as to provide a precise definition for "computer program'' -s. 2 defines computer
program as' 'a set of instructions or statements, expressed, fixed, embodied or stored
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exclusive right to reproduce, distribute or otherwise display these works
and works substantially derived from them. i:i This right extends to computer programs and the publication of materials, such as user manuals
and guides, that instruct users on how to use ce1tain applications and
technologies. 14 Most copyright subsists for the life of the author plus 50
years. 15
Statutory protection given under the Copyright Act is automatically
granted to every original work provided that the author meets the qualifications set out in the legislation. 16 In contrast with patents, there is no
necessity for registration under the Copyright Act; however, it is strongly
recommended, since such registration serves as evidence of the existence
of the copyrighted work and allows an owner to enjoy significant practical and tactical benefits. 17
in any manner, that is to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a specific result".
,., Section 54 of the Copyright Act establishes a register of copyrights in which ''names
and addresses of authors, and such other pa11iculars as may be prescribed" may be
entered. Any one of the author, publisher, owner or ·'other person interested" may
cause particulars to be entered in the register.
J.j
The time, effort and financial resources required to create a computer program are
significant. In an early computer copyright infringement case, Apple Computer. Inc.
claimed that it took 146 person-months to create 14 related programs at a cost of
more than $740,000 (U.S.), excluding the costs associated with creating oracquiring
earlier versions of the programs: Apple Computer Inc. r. Franklin Computer Corp.
( 1985), 7 I 4 F. 2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), at 1245.
" Copyright Act, s. 6.
'" Section 5( I) of the Copyright Act affords protection to the nationals of all Berne
Convention signatory nations. Both Canada and the United States arc signatories.
17
In particular, pursuant to s. 39 of the Copyright Act. the registration of a copyright
prior to infringement will permit a plaintiff to seek remedies beyond mere injunctive
relief, which is the only remedy available to a plaintiff who has not registered.
Section 39 provides as follows:
Where proceedings are taken in respect of the infringement of the copyright
in any work and the defendant in his defence alleges that he was not aware of
the existence of the copyright in the work, the plaintiff is not entitled to any
remedy other than an injunction in respect of rhe infringement if the defendant
proves that at the date of the infringement he was not aware and had no reasonable
ground for suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work. but (fat the date of
iiifringement the copyright in the work was duly registered under this Act, the
defendalll shall be deemed to have had reasonable ground for suspecting that
copyright subsisted in the work.
[Emphasis added.]
Registration of copyright prior to an infringement thus clears the way for monetary
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In 1988, Parliament amended a number of the federal intellectual
prope1ty statutes to account for technological changes. 18 One of the most
significant revisions resulted in specific inclusion of "computer pro19
grams" within the scope of Canada's copyright protection laws. The
Copyright Act now extends copyright protection to computer programs
by deeming them to be "literary works" .20 The term "computer program" in the Copyright Act includes computer programs stored in the
form of high-level source code (programming languages readable by
humans, such as FORTRAN, BASIC, Pascal, COBAL, or C), as well as
those programs converted and stored as object code (machine language
readable by computers as binary impulses of electricity). 21

As a "literary work" capable of copyright, a computer program
must satisfy all the statutory requirements of copyright, including originality. Once these requirements are met, an author can enforce his or
her copyright over a computer program in the same manner as any other
copyrighted work.

(d)

Trade-marks

Trade-marks are words, names, logos, symbols or other structures,
used to identify, distinguish or associate, by recognition and through
use, goods or services or their quality, with or from those of other
parties. 22 The owner of a registered trade-mark under the Trade-marks
Act has the exclusive right to use that mark in association with a defined
damages, delivery up of the infringing work and injunctive relief. Even though the
Copyright Act does not expressly deem' 'marking'' a work with the copyright symbol
as equivalent to registration, one Canadian small claims court case, albeit oflimited
precedential weight, has implicitly stated it to be so: see Fletcher v. Polka Dot
Fabrics Ltd. (1993), 51 C.P.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).
rn See S.C. 1988, c. 15. All references to '"the federal intellectual property legislation''
or "federal intellectual property statutes" in this at1icle will, where the context
permits, collectively refer to the Patent Act, the Copyright Act, the Trade-marks Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 ("Trade-marks Act"), the Industrial Design Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. I-9 ("IDA") and the Integrated Circuit Topography Act, S.C. 1990, c. 37
("ICTA").
'" Copyright Act, s. 2.
20
Ibid., s. 2. The definition of "literary work" includes "tables, computer programs,
and compilations of literary works''.
21
Ibid., s. 2.
" Trade-marks Act, ss. 2( I), 19.
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class of goods or services. 2 .i Typically, trade-mark registrations are made
for 15-year periods, with 15-year renewals on payment of a renewal
fee. 2-1
A trade-mark consists of both the name or loao
and the underlyinab
b
25
goodwill of the business that resides in the mark. Although difficult to
quantify precisely, this goodwill exists in and is measured by every
customer that associates a particular name or logo with a particular
quality or type of product. The level of goodwill increases by an owner's
maintenance and "nurturing" of trade names or logos, which in turn
maximize consumer recognition of the trade-mark.
A trade-mark is founded in and maintained by use. 26 The party that
first uses the mark in association with particular goods or services is the
party entitled to register the mark in association with those goods or
services.27 In addition, a mark may attain value in Canada without such
prior use if the mark was made known in Canada or if it is a registered
and used trade-mark in a Paris Convention country. 28
Both existing and proposed or intended trade-marks may be registered at the Trade-marks Branch of the Canadian Intellectual Prope11y
Office in Hull, Quebec upon application. A notice registration puts the
public on notice of the use of a particular mark in association with the
2

~

lbidn s. I 9.
Ibid .. s. 46( I). It is important to note that upon failure to pay the renewal fee. the
trade-mark will be expunged from the register within a six-month period. pursuant
to s. 46(3).
2
"'
For exarnple~ son1e or the essential assets of Coca-Cola Ltd./Ltee. arc its trade-n1arks
which include "Coca-Cola ... "Coke". ·'Coca-Cola Classic". "Coke Classic•·,
'·coca-Cola Classique." "Coke Classique". and the stylized "C." Without these
universally recognizable trade-marks within the corporate asset pool, it is difficult
to envisage how Coca-Cola Ltd./Ltee. would be much different from other "noname" soft drink makers.
26
Trade-marks Act, s. 16( I )(a).
27
Such use is effected by commercial sale of the goods or services in the ordinary
course of trade and an accompanying association of the mark with those goods or
services by placing the trade-mark visibly on the wares.
"" Trade-marks Act, ss. 5(b), 16(2). While the foreign registration must be in a Paris
Convention '·country of origin," use of the trade-mark in any country is acceptable.
Both Canada and the United States are signatories to the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property - there are currently 127 other signatories to the
Paris Convention.
'"
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particular goods or services of a registrant. A proposed or intended use
registration can be opposed by any party who can prove prior use of the
trade-mark in association with the stated goods or services. A trademark will not become registered under the Trade-marks Act until the
applicant has filed a declaration of use confirming that the trade-mark
has been used in Canada.
(e)

Industrial Designs

The Industrial Design Act affords protection to those who create
"designs" by permitting registration of designs that are applied in an
industrial or manufacturing setting. In order for a design to be registered
under the IDA, it should include ''features of shape, configuration,
pattern or ornament and any combination of those features that, in a
finished article, appeal to and are judged solely by the eye." 29 Courts
have held that the design must be both appealing to the eye, and visually
separate from the object to which it is applied. 30 Only the "proprietor"
of the design is entitled to register it." The author of any design is
considered to be its proprietor unless the author executed the design for
another person, in which case the other person is considered to be the
design proprietor.
No protection is afforded to "features applied to a useful a11icle
that are dictated solely by utilitarian function of the article" or to "any
method or principle of manufacture or construction'' .' 2 ''Useful article''
is defined as ''an article that has a utilitarian function and includes a
model of any such article" and "utilitarian function" means "a function
other than merely serving as a substrate or carrier for artistic or literary
matter'' .33
As a result of the imprecise and ambiguous language found in the
IDA, it is possible to have designs registered under the IDA as well as
under trade-mark, patent and copyright legislation. If a design is regis2 '>

°

1

31
32

31

IDA, s. 2.
Clatworthy & Son Ltd. v. Dale Display Fixtures Ltd., [ 1928] Ex. C.R. 159 (Can. Ex.
Ct.), at 162; affd [1929] S.C.R. 429.
IDA, s. 4.
Ibid.. s. 5.1.
Ibid., s. 2.
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tered within one year from the date it is first published in Canada,
exclusive right of use of the design for a maximum of 10 years will be
granted to the successful applicant. 34

product. Since Canada is not a leader in integrated circuit technology,
there has been very little use of the ICTA.
(g)

(f)

Integrated Circuits

In response to international pressure to specifically protect microchip technology ratherthan relying on traditional copyright laws, Canada
enacted the Integrated Circuit Topography Act in June, 1990. This
legislation aims at protecting the original design of an integrated circuit
topography, whether it has been embodied in an integrated circuit product or not, and whether the integrated circuit product is in a final or an
intermediate form. 15 An "integrated circuit" is simply a microchip, and
the design of the interconnections of the circuits on the microchip is the
"topography". It is the topographical design that is protected under the
ICTA, by allowing for the topography of an integrated circuit to be
registered. To be in registrable form, a topography must be original.36
The ICTA protects registered topographies for a period of up to 10
years.-17
Integrated circuit topographies are not capable of copyright protection under the Copyright Act as works, and have been expressly carved
out of the legislation. 38 Instead, exclusive rights to integrated circuits
can only be obtained by registration under the ICTA. However, section
64.2(2) of the Copyright Act clarifies the interplay between the ICTA
and the Copyright Act by providing that, although topographies are not
copyrightable per se, copyright protection does extend to computer
programs and other works that are embodied in an integrated circuit
'"
'-'
36

Ibid.. SS. 10(1), 14(1).
ICTA, s. 2.
The term "original" is defined in the ICTA at s. 4(2) as being conditional upon the
following:
(a) it has not been produced by the mere reproduction of another topography or of any
substantial pai1 thereof: and
(h) it is the result of an intellectual effon and is not. at the time of its creation. wmmonplace
among creators of topographies or manufacturers of integrated circuit products.

37

"

Ibid.• s. 5.
Copyright Act, s. 64.2(1) states: ''This Act does not apply. and shall be deemed
never to have applied, to any topography or to any design. however expressed. that
is intended to generate all or part of a topography."
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Licences

A licence allows a licensor to retain ownership of an intellectual
property right while permitting the licensee to use the licensed property
for a fee without infringing the licensor's ownership interest. Licences
can divide up the intellectual property rights of the owner in a number
of ways:
( 1) by the nature or extent of activity that can be undertaken

by the licensee;
(2) by the geographical extent of the rights; or
(3) by the time frame involved.
Licences can be either exclusive or non-exclusive. Licensing of
intellectual property rights is now commonplace, especially with software developers, where the most practicable way to realize profits is to
license products to third parties. All forms of licences are capable of
producing an income stream that can be collateralized as security for
lenders. 39

(h)

Other Proprietary Interests of Value

When a bmTower begins to market its intellectual property to the
buying public and enters into sales contracts, valuable rights (largely
contractual and intangible in nature) may also be generated. In much the
same way as the ultimate sale of inventory by a traditional supplier has
the effect of transforming collateral goods into cash and accounts receivable, the marketing and sale of intellectual and intangible property,
3' 1

Although all of the federal intellectual property statutes provide for the taking of
partial grants or licences in intellectual property, there is some confusion as to
whether security interests in those licences can be taken and whether in fact they
should be registered. Clearly, while the issue oflicensing is expressly contemplated
under the federal regimes, the issue of taking a security interest in or over such
licences is not. For example, see ss. 66 and 67 of the Patent Act, s. 7(2) of the JCTA,
ss. 13(2) and (3) of the IDA. ss. 15 to 26 of the Copyright Act and s. 50( I) of the
Trade-marks Act. This issue will be discussed further in sec. 4, ··Federal Intellectual
Property Legislation''.
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including any servicing contracts related to such sales, has the same
transformative effect. However, unlike tangible goods that are sold from
inventory, when intellectual and other intangible property products are
sold, many of the property rights found in the underlying asset are
retained. These can include the underlying trade-mark and copyright
components of the asset and any licensing arrangements that may be
entered into by the owner with third parties._ These contractual rights
may be of significant value and can, if properly charged, represent
substantial collateral to lenders.
(i)

(5) Tangible Property
• current and all future inventories of all copies of and
manuals for the program
• future inventory of subsequent versions of the program
• all equipment (computer and otherwise) used in the creation of the program
(6) Intangible Property
• licence contracts with distributors of the program
• service contracts with end-users of the program

Summary

• royalty payments generated from all sources arising out
of royalty arrangements for a fixed rate fee or pursuant
to a royalty structure

All of the above are common forms of intellectual property assets.
To see how these may interact in practice, consider the example of a
computer company that has developed a marketable program. Some of
the different types of prope1ty that may be embodied within or baenerated
from this particular intellectual property asset include the following:4o

• contracts with the publisher of the program manuals
• contracts with distributors of the program

( 1) Copyrights

• licence contracts on subsequent versions of the program

• right to reproduce copies of the program

• cash and accounts receivable generated from all sales of
the program

• right to develop works based on the program

• client and marketing lists

(2) Trade-marks
• right to use and to license others to use the program's
name (and any other registered logo or design related to
it)
(3) Industrial Designs
• right to use the confidential design of the program
• rights in the confidential process that developed the program
( 4) Integrated Circuits

• right to use and to license others to use reaistered
topoao
b
raphies
40

The example provided is an adaptation of an example by R. Nimmer and P.
Krauthaus: see "Secured Financing and Information Prope11y Rights" ( 1988), 2
High Tech. L. J. 195, at 202-203.
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• trade secrets
Once a lender has properly identified all the intellectual and intangible assets that a borrower has available for security purposes, the next
step is to ensure that proper security can be taken over such property.
The next part of this article explores the methods of taking security under
provincial PPSAs, with a focus on Ontario. The parts that follow discuss
federal statutes that operate on intellectual property assets and that may
also provide scope for collateralization.

3.

TAKING SECURITY UNDER THE PPSA

(a)

Statutory Considerations: Issues and Procedures

(i)

Scope of the PPSA

The PPSA applies to all consensual transactions between parties
that create in substance a security interest in personal property, without
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regard to title or form. 41 In the high-technology financing context, two
key concerns arise:

these include goodwill, literary rights, and rights to performances, as
well as copyrights, patents and trade-marks.

(1) the scope of "personal property" covered by the PPSA;

Given both the broad wording in the PPSA, and the favourable
interpretation found in American jurisprudence, the better argument is
that intellectual property comes within the ambit of the PPSA. The more
important subject for discussion, however, is how intellectual property
is perfected under the PPSA.

and
(2) whether intellectual property comes within the ambit of
that definition and, if so, how to obtain an enforceable
"security interest" in such property.
Personal prope11y is defined in section I of the PPSA as "chattel
paper, documents of title, goods, instruments, intangibles, money and
securities" (emphasis added). In order to fall within the definition of
personal property under the PPSA, therefore, intellectual property must
be considered "intangible" personal prope11y. "Intangible" is defined
in section l of the PPSA as including choses in action. The definition
makes no express reference to the inclusion of intellectual property, but
it is not exhaustive. Although the matter has never been judicially determined, a number of commentators have reached the conclusion that
intellectual prope11y does fall within the scope of the PPSA. 42
This view is suppo11ed by American jurisprudence in the area.
Article 9-102(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (" UCC" )41 applies
to transactions intended to create a security interest in personal property,
including "general intangibles". In turn, article 9-106 defines "general
intangibles" as "any personal property (including things in action other
than goods), accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and
money." In the official comment that follows the section, examples of
41

42

4
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PPSA, s. 2.
Sec, for example. C.S. Zimmerman. L. Bertrand and L. Dunlop, ''Intellectual Property in Secured Transactions" ( J 99 J), 8 C.1.P.R. 74, at 76-7. where a number of
sources are provided as support for the proposition that intellectual property constitutes intangible personal property on the basis of being considered at law as choses
in action. In Planet Earth. supra, note I. Carter D.C.J. held that photographic
negatives, and the copyright interests therein, were exigible under s. 19(2) of the
Execution Act. R.S.O. 1980, c. 146 (now R.S.O. 1990, c. E.24), which refers to
"book debts and other choses in action".
Since the personal property security statutes in Canada arc modelled after the UCC.
the UCC and cases decided under it are ideal reference points for assisting with the
interpretation of questions that arise in the Canadian personal property security
context. Sec. as well, B. Clark. The Law of Secured Transactions Under the l/CC.
rev. ed. (Boston: Warren Gorham Lamont, 1995), which is the leading treatise in the
United States on the UCC.

(ii)

Perfection Under the PPSA

A.

General Principles

The PPSA has effectively standardized the taking of security interests in personal property and in so doing has lessened the need for using
common law and equitable constmcts. The actual transfer of title is no
longer required under the legislative scheme.44 Assuming that intellectual property falls within the definition of "intangibles" in the PPSA,
"attachment" and "perfection" are required to obtain an enforceable
security interest in intellectual property.
Section 19 of the PPSA makes attachment of a security interest a
prerequisite to its perfection. Section 11 (l) of the PPSA states that unless
attachment has occurred, a security interest will not be enforceable
against third parties.45 A security interest attaches under section 11 (2)
of the PPSA once three requirements are met:
(l) the debtor has rights in the collateral;

(2) the debtor has signed a security agreement identifying the
collateral; and
(3) value has been given.
The order in which these occur is of no consequence. 46
44

4'

46

In many circumstances, it should be noted that the common law and equitable
methods continue to exist and arc used in the case of security interests in licence
agreements and contractual rights: see. il{fra, at sec. 3(b ), "'Licences under the
PPSA".
Note that a non-attached security interest is nevertheless enforceable as between the
debtor and secured party. notwithstanding its unenforceability against third parties.
See, for example, First City Capital Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen Inc. (1984), 46 O.R.
(2d) 168, 9 D.L.R. (4th) l 17, 4 P.P.S.A.C. 74 (H.C.).
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Perfection under section 19 of the PPSA requires registration of a
financing statement that identifies the collateral secured by the security
agreement. 47 Registration of the financing statement may be completed
before or after the security agreement is executed:18
B.

Specific IP Concerns: After-Acquired Property

Under section 12 of the PPSA, a security interest in intangible
prope1ty will automatically extend to after-acquired property, as long as
the parties to the security agreement indicate an intention to do so. This
is typically set out in security agreements in the form of an "afteracquired property clause". However, traditional conceptions of what
after-acquired property is need to be stretched to fit the more esoteric
high-technology world. For example, it is a question whether the
following should be considered after-acquired prope1ty:
( 1) research and development, an important component of

high-technology companies, which results in frequent enhancements or new inventions, related marks and works
under trade-mark and copyright law; or
(2) companion technologies, whereby the inherent value of
original computer technology becomes interconnected
with newly developed products.
In both of these cases, the value of security may be significantly reduced
without such related marks or companion technology. As a result, intellectual property security agreements should provide for the automatic
collateralization of all such after-acquired property for the benefit of the
secured creditor, because that property ensures the continued value of
the intellectual property collateral.
To gain automatic attachment of security interests under section 12
of the PPSA, a debtor must have an interest in the after-acquired property. This may present a problem in the context of intellectual property.
Under the Patent Act, for example, new research developments must be
17
•

·IX

Even though the PPSA recognizes three ways perfection can occur (temporary
perfection. possession or registration), only registration applies to a lender in the
high-technology context: s. 22 of the PPSA limits the possession method of perfection to chattel goods. instruments, secu1ities, negotiable documents of title and
money. Likewise, s. 24 of the PPSA limits temporary perfection to security interests
in instruments, securities or negotiable documents of title.
PPSA, s. 45(3).
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registered separately in order to receive patent protection. The same
applies for additions to trade-marks and copyrights under those Acts.
To ensure successful capture of after-acquired intellectual property
rights, they should be clearly described in the security agreement. This
may allow any additional related intellectual property rights of the owner
to be automatically secured under the security agreement without the
need to enter into a new security agreement. Because of the complexities
associated with federal Acts, however, creditors may have to seek separate security arrangements with debtors to ensure that after-acquired
property continues to be covered under the security agreement. 49 At a
bare minimum, security agreements should include a clause providing
the creditor with a right of first refusal on any future developments or
registrations of intellectual property.

(b)

Licences Under the PPSA

Where the object of a security interest is not a particular intellectual
property asset but rather a licence or an exclusive right to use a particular
intellectual prope1ty right, additional issues arise as to the proper application of the PPSA. In cases where the borrower may be a licensee of
intellectual property, the concern for lenders is obtaining security over
the borrower's right to use that licensed property. Judicial treatment of
this form of security under PPSA legislation is still unsettled.
(i)

licences as Personal Property?

A revocable or retractable licence or quota issued under public
statutory authority has been held not to constitute intangible personal
property within the meaning of the PPSA in National Trust Co. v.
Bouckhuyt. 50 The Court of Appeal held that despite the fact that a to4•i

50

See sec. 5. "Federal-Provincial Conflict (or Peaceful Coexistence?)". inji·a. for a
detailed discussion on this point.
( 1987), 43 D.L.R. (4th) 543. 7 P.P.S.A.C. 273 (Ont. C.A.). revg 39 D.L.R. (4th) 60,
7 P.P.S.A.C. 113 (H.C.J.) ("Bouckhuyt"). A series of cases have considered and
applied the reasoning in this decision. including Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Hallahan (1990). I P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 58, 69 D.L.R. (4th) 49 (Ont. C.A.),
leave to appeal refused (1991), 74 D.L.R. (4th) viii. 49 B.L.R. 320 (note) (S.C.C.)
("Hallahan"), which dealt with a milk quota under the Milk Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.
266 (now R.S.O. 1990, c. M.12). The fact that the Hallahan decision did not recognize a milk quota as intangible personal prope11y under the PPSA is particularly
egregious since it excused what was almost certainly a fraudulent conveyance in that
case. Bouckhuyt was also applied in a nursing home case, namely 209991 Ontario
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bacco-production quota contained the typical indicia of proprietary interests (it could be leased, transferred and pledged) and that the secured
party had registered a financing statement against the debtor in priority
to all other claimants, the quota, because it was subject to the absolute
discretion of the marketing board, was a mere statutory licence or privilege and was not prope1ty within the ambit of the PPSA. This decision
has been criticized because, by taking such a narrow view of personal
property, it ignores modem commercial reality. It also takes an approach
that is squarely at odds with many American decisions involving licences
under article 9 of the UCC.5'
Notwithstanding this criticism, Bouckhuyt remains the law in Ontario. In Hallahan, the Court of Appeal upheld the Bouckhuyt decision
(seemingly on a reluctant basis), but did issue an invitation to revisit the
question of what constitutes personal property at a later date:
It occurs to us. however. that it would be useful to have Bouckhuvt reconsidered.
It seems to us that the court placed too much emphasis on traditional definitions
of personal property and did not give enough consideration to the realities of
commercial transactions within the regulatory framework of modern farm products marketing scheme.-'2

Unfortunately, the court has rescinded its own invitation to reconsider

51

52

Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (J 988), 24 C.P.C. (2cl) 248. 8
P.P.S.A.C. 135 (Ont. S.C.) ("20999/"). In 209991. the court concluclecl that since
the Minister of Health maintained significant discretion over the transferability of
nursing home licences, the licence was a mere privilege ancl not a property right.
However, clue to subsequent revisions made to the Nursing Home Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. N. 7, licensees were expressly conferred the right by virtue of subsection I (I) of
the Nursing Home Act to create security interest in their nursing home licences, thus
statutorily over-turning the result reached in 20999 I. The recently released decision
in Sugannan v. Duca Community Credit Union Ltd. ( 1988 ). 38 O.R. (3d) 429 (Ont.
Ct. (Gen Div.)), which involved a nursing home licence. has confirmed that nursing
home licences are in the nature of property rights and can be the proper subjectmatter of a security interest under the PPSA.
See, for example, the commentary of R.H. McLaren on Bouckhuvt at 7 P.P.S.A.C.
273 at 274. See also R.M. Mercier, "Saskatoon Auction Mart: .Milk Quotas and
Finally Some Commercial Reality" ( 1993), 22 C.B.L.J. 466 ancl Johnson, "Security
Interests in Discretionary Licenses Under the Ontario PPSA" ( 1993), 8 B.F.L. Re~.
123.
Hallahan, supra, note 50, at 61.
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Bouckhuyt, most notably in Bank of Montreal v. Bale53 and Ontario
Dairy Cow Leasing Ltd. v. Ontario (Milk Marketing Board). 54
Nevertheless, there are a few lower-court exceptions to these decisions. Re Foster' 5 established that a taxi licence is personal property
and subject to a security interest because it is not very transitory and is
commercially marketable. This ''commercial marketability'' test has
been applied in Saskatoon Auction Mart Ltd. v. Finesse Holsteins, 56
where the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench recognized that the
quota's transferability and its partial granting of rights created property
rights. In a second Bank of Montreal v. Bale case, 57 the court, although
not questioning whether a milk quota constituted intangible property
under the PPSA per se, held that the Bank of Montreal was entitled to
enforce its secured rights granted in the milk quota because the security
agreement constituted an equitable assignment.
Although statutory licences and privileges have been held not to
fall under the PPSA, this should not be the case for "private" commercial context licences, because the issues are different between arm'slength commercial licences and statutory schemes. Moreover, in a private licence, the contractual relations and, to a much lesser extent, public
policy issues, govern the agreement. Unfortunately, there is a lack of
jurispmdence in Canada as to whether these private licences are precluded from being considered personal property on the basis of Bouckhuyt. In the end, whether a private licence constitutes personal property
or not will depend on the terms of the underlying contract between the
parties as contained in the licensing agreement.
5.i

54

55

56

57

1992), 4 P.P.S.A.C. (2cl) 114 (Ont. C.A.). affg ( 1991 ), 2 P.P.S.A.C. (2cl) 194 (Gen.
Div.), leave to appeal refused (1993), 68 O.A.C. 239 (note) (S.C.C.).
(I 993).4 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 269 (Ont. C.A.), rcvgon othergrouncls (I 990), I P.P.S.A.C.
(2d) 149 (Gen. Div.). In this case, the court. despite concurring in the holdings of
both Boucklmvt ancl Hallahan that a milk quota was not intangible personal property
under the PPSA, nevertheless, it permitted the assignment of the proceeds from the
sale of the quota. See also, R.H. McLaren, Secured Transactions in Personal Property in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1993), at 1-9.
(1992), 89 D.LR. (4th) 555, 3 P.P.S.A.C. (2cl) 6 (Ont. Bktcy.). This decision is
difficult to rationalize and is probably wrongly decided in light of the Ontario Court
of Appeal's decisions in Bouckhuyt and Hallahan, supra, note 50. It is nevertheless
a useful decision in support of statutory licences qualifying as intangible property.
[ 1993] I W.W.R. 265, 4 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 67 (Sask. Q.B.) ("Saskatoon Auction
Mart").
(1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 187, 7 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 121 (Gen. Div.).
(
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A problem that may become a concern for creditors and debtors
involved in financing intellectual property is whether the granting of a
licence itself can be considered to be a dealing of property that gives
rise to proceeds of collateral for the purposes of the PPSA. The matter
has received little or no judicial attention in Canada or the United States,
but there is a smattering of American commentary on the topic. 58
Article 9-306(2) of the UCC states that a security interest continues
in collateral notwithstanding "sale, exchange, or other disposition
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party ...
and ... continues in any identifiable proceeds (emphasis added). Section
25( I) of the PPSA, in conjunction with the definition of' 'proceeds'' in
section I, is similar in effect. 59 The argument that a licence represents
proceeds starts with an examination of what a software licence does.
Regardless of whether a software licence is exclusive or non-exclusive,
licences exist in order for a licensor to maintain control over copyright
and other intellectual property rights. Since software programs can theoretically be copied and used an infinite number of times without diminution of quality, using a program is notionally equivalent to using
equipment or inventory. 60 Nevertheless, software programs depreciate
in value over time as new products become available that are superior
to the old. In this way, software licensing functions more like a lease of
goods.
Either way, a software developer's business depends on licensing
arrangements rather than on sales. Because title is never transferred, a
licensee of software merely obtains the right to use the collateral. From
this, it follows that the software functions in a manner equivalent to
5
'

This argument is based on a discussion that arose on the ucclaw listserv ucc/aH'-l
assocdir. wuacc.edu during the Spring of 1998. We thank Professor Benjamin Geva
for alerting us to this debate and providing copies of the discussion.
5
''
Section I(I) of the PPSA defines proceeds as "identifiable or traceable personal
property in any form derived directly or indirectly from any dealing with collateral
or the proceeds therefrom, and includes any payment representing indemnity or
compensation for loss of or damage to the collateral or proceeds therefrom." Section
25( I) states: "Where collateral gives rise to proceeds. the security interest therein,
(a) continues as to the collateral, unless the secured party expressly or impliedly
authorized the dealing with the collateral; and (b) extends to the proceeds."
"" Sec, for example. In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
where coins from a video machine were held not to be proceeds.
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leased inventory, and creditors can therefore retain an interest in the
collateral (the licence) and the proceeds. 61 It is arguable, however, that
a software licensor is dealing with collateral for the purposes of article
9-306(2) of the UCC (section 1 of the PPSA) and that the nature of the
software business means that a creditor will be aware of this fact. This
awareness can be considered de facto consent to the disposition, which
precludes any continuing security interest in the collateral under article
9-306(2) of the UCC (or an implied authorization under section 25( I )(a)
of the PPSA). In effect, under this reading, the activity of licensing
software is "dealing with collateral" for the purposes of the PPSA, and
the imputed knowledge of creditors may therefore defeat a security
interest.
The lack of case law on this point in both Canada and the United
States makes it difficult to predict whether courts will adopt this construction. In any event, it is likely to have consequences only where
bankruptcy occurs because, in the normal course of things, the proceeds
(licence or royalty fees) will remain secured as proceeds of collateral
under section 25( 1)(b ). In addition, there are practical steps that creditors
may take to further protect the possibility of this occurring.
(iii)

Practical Considerations for Secured Creditors

Before a borrower's licence can be seen as constituting personal
property for the purposes of the PPSA, it must be vested absolutely in
the debtor. Discretionary authority over a licence, whether associated
with a public authority or pursuant to the terms of a private agreement,
detracts from the bundle of rights that are vested in the licensee. This
does not mean that the licence needs to be exclusive. A non-exclusive
licence can be the subject-matter of a security agreement if the licence
is absolute, even though it may be limited in some respect by the extent
or nature of its use or application. 62 But where the interest under a licence
agreement is defined as personal, non-exclusive, or non-transferable, or
61

62

This analysis is in agreement with PEB Commentary No. 9 (UCC. article 9-306( I)),
25 June 1992. which holds that sales of equipment disguised as leases and "true"
leases, are both dispositions of goods of either the entire portion of the lessor's
interest (effective sale) or partial disposition with residual interest thus allowing any
proceeds thereof to continue as security interests.
Armstrong Cork Canada Ltd. v. Domco Industries Ltd. (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 46
(S.C.C), at 56.
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where all proprietary rights in the subject-matter of the licence are
reserved in the licensor, the value of any security interest granted in such
a licence may be greatly diminished. In some cases, the licence may not
constitute property as defined in the PPSA. Finally, where a licence is
time-restricted, the security agreement may be nullified by the expiration
of the underlying licence.
Where a secured creditor is seeking to obtain an assignment of the
debtor's rights and obligations as a licensee of intellectual property, the
secured creditor should obtain certain covenants from the debtor. These
covenants should ensure that all obligations under the licence agreement
will be perfonned and that the debtor will not go into default under the
terms of the licence agreement. In addition, it is likely that a licence
agreement between a debtor and a licensor of intellectual property will
require a specific consent or acknowledgment of any security assignment.63
In cases where a borrower is the licensor of intellectual property, a
secured creditor must ensure that it obtains the right to the royalty
payments or I icensing fees otherwise receivable by the debtor. To ensure
co-operation with respect to assigning a debtor's rights as licensor, a
secured creditor should arrange with the debtor for the licensee to execute an acknowledgment of the security interest being taken by the
secured creditor. This acknowledgment should also include provisions
that require the licensee to deliver all required licensing fees and royalty
payments to the creditor on default by the debtor.
(c)

Temporal Limitations

Intellectual property rights, as shown previously, primarily arise as
a result of statute. Although these rights are initially monopolistic, many
are limited by temporal considerations, since under the federal intellectual prope1iy legislation each of the rights exists at law only for a
specified period of time. As a result, it is extremely important for lenders
to gain a thorough understanding of when the debtor's rights in the
underlying intellectual property expire. 64 Obviously, for the lender, a
6
·'

1H

For a more in-depth discussion of licensing concerns see Zimmerman, Bertrand and
Dunlop, supra, note 42, at 79-80.
As noted by Zimmerman. Bertrand and Dunlop, ibid.. at 76. trade-marks, trade names
and trade secrets are not subject to time limitations in the same way as copyrights,
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lengthy expiration period is preferred. By way of illustration, in a case
where the author is the first owner of the copyright, regardless of any
agreement to the contrary, the copyright reverts to the author's estate
(heirs or representatives) 25 years after the death of the author (unless
the author's will provides for a contrary intention). 65 If the Copyright
Act were changed to allow reversion after five years, for example, the
value of copyright as an asset would diminish.

(d)

Summary

This section has reviewed some of the areas where the PPSA interacts with intellectual property issues. In most cases, PPSA registration
will be of benefit to creditors who wish to secure intellectual property
assets. However, there are some areas where the interaction of provincial
PPSA laws and the federal jurisdiction over intellectual property remains
to be determined. The next section explores the various federal legislative provisions that allow collateralization of assets; section 5 examines
the jurisdictional concerns.

4.
(a)

FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION
Introduction

While the PPSA is available for those interested in gaining a security interest in intellectual property, it is also possible, where the
collateral includes patents, trade-marks, industrial designs, circuit topographies and copyrights (registered orunregistered), to register certain
types of interests under the federal intellectual property legislation. However, the effect, if any, of such registration on the creation, perfection or
priority of the security interest under a PPSA remains unclear in Canada
because of the federal-provincial jurisdictional split, and the absence of
clarifying language in the statutes. 66 The discussion below centres on

6

5

M

for example. In the case of trade-marks. a registration will remain effective for as
long as the registrant continues to use the registered trade-mark properly and maintains all registrations in relation thereto. In this regard, lenders arc well advised to
determine which trade-marks the borrower cun-cntly uses. whether that use has been
continuous and whether all licensees have been properly recorded as registered users.
Copyright Act. s. 14( I).
Sec Zimmerman. Bertrand and Dunlop. supra, note 42 at 87; also sec. 5, "FederalProvincial Conflict (or Peaceful Coexistence?)''. infra.
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the availability of security under the specific federal intellectual propeity
statutes.

(b)

Patents

The Patent Act does not expressly deal with the granting of security
interests in patent rights. Sections 49 and 50 of the Act provide for the
"assignment" of patentable inventions, patent applications and patents
as long as it is expressed by an instrument in writing. Notwithstanding
that the registration of a patentable invention or patent application is
permissive only (although such registration is strongly recommended)/'7
an assignment of a patent must be registered in order to be enforceable
against third parties. 68
Failing to register these various interests means a bona fide third
patty purchaser without notice can escape the effects of any prior assignment. Section 51 of the Patent Act stipulates that:
every assignment affecting a patent for invention, whether it is one referred to in
section 49 or 50 [assignment or invention, application or patent] is void against
any subsequent assignee, unless the assignment is registered as prescribed [in the
Patent Act] ... before registration or the instrument under which the subsequent
assignee claims.

As a result, assignments not properly registered in the Canadian Intellectual Property Office cannot be used against a subsequent assignee
who has acquired the patentable invention, the patent application or the
patent itself without notice and who subsequently registers under the
Patent Act. As in the case of security interests generally, assignments
for the purpose of providing security to creditors are not expressly dealt
with in the Patent Act. These assignments should be carefully reviewed
by the creditor to ensure that the full ambit of rights is being assigned
over and that the debtor has the requisite rights to assign.
(c)

Copyrights

A copyright owner may grant an assignment of a copyrighted work
to an assignee or an interest in a copyright by assigning such rights or
by entering into a licence agreement. Section 57 of the Copyright Act
not only provides a mechanism for recording ownership of copyrights
at the Copyright Office, it also permits (without expressly requiring) the
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registration of a "grant of interest, either by assignment or licence" in
copyrights. The grant of a copyright interest, whether by assignment or
licence, must be properly recorded in the Register of Copyrights at the
Copyright Office for the grant to be protected against a subsequent
assignee for value without notice. No link is drawn in the Copyright Act
between this grant of interest concept and the creation of security interests.
Section 54 of the Copyright Act provides for the establishment and
maintenance of a copyright register and index to record particulars of
copyrighted works. In accordance with section 54(2) of the Copyright
Act, registration is not required in order for the author to have a protected
work. Registering a work confers on the owner the means for proving
subsistence and ownership of the copyrighted work and creates a rebuttable presumption in favour of the registrant. This has the practical
effect of placing the onus on the party challenging the validity of ownership or authorship to prove non-ownership. 69 Furthermore, registration
places would-be infringers on notice that the registrant has and intends
(if it so chooses) to enforce its copyright. Registration also allows the
registrant to benefit from statutory remedies available in infringement
situations. 70
Unfortunately, the Copyright Act does not define what is meant by
the term "assignment" as used in section 57. As a result, it is unclear
whether the term includes an assignment entered into for the sole purpose
of providing security. On this basis, the prudent course of action is to
register all assignments and licences under the Copyright Act, since the
consequences associated with failing to register assignments and licences of copyrights are significant. Licences or assignments not properly registered or not registered at all are void as against subsequent
licensees or assignees for valuable consideration.
The other aspect of copyright is an author's moral rights, which are
inherent in a work. Moral rights include the author's right to protect the
integrity of the work and his or her right to remain associated with the
69

70

"
"

7
8

Patent Act, s. 49(2).
Ibid., s. 50(2).

69

Copyright Act, s. 53(2). It appears from case law that a certificate of registration
only constitutes a rebuttable presumption: see Circle Film Ente17>rises Inc. v. Canadian Broadcasting Co17> .. [ 1959] S.C.R. 602, 31 C.P.R. 57.
The evidence that must be led to successfully rebut an issued copyright certificate
must be credible and telling: see Alkot Industries Inc. v. Consumers Distributing
ltd. (I 985), 6 C.l.P.R. 84, 6 C.P.R. (3d) 168 (Fed. T.D.).
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work as its author in accordance with section 14. l of the Copyright Act.
Although the economic rights of an author in a copyrighted work can
be assigned, a security interest cannot be taken in the moral rights of the
author. 71 For this reason, creditors taking a security interest in copyrights
should obtain a moral rights waiver from the author in the event of
default. Where a waiver has already been obtained from the author by a
prior assignee of the copyright, the first assignee can subsequently assign
the moral rights waiver to the creditor provided that the original waiver
is drafted so as to include assignees.

(d)

Trade-marks

Although the Patent Act speaks of assignments and the Copyright
Act of both assignments and licences, the Trade-marks Act provides for
"transfers" of trade-marks without defining the term. 72 As a result, it is
unclear whether a ''transfer'' of a trade-mark might be used for security
interest purposes. In addition, although the Trade-marks Branch will
record notice of a security agreement on its register, it will not determine
priority by the registration of a notice, unlike assignments of patents and
copyrights. Creditors must assess whether or not a borrower's use of a
currently registered trade-mark may be intem1pted or undermined by
third-patty opposition or prior or parallel use by another party, which
may bring the enforceability of the mark against third parties into question. In addition, creditors should establish that the collateralized mark
is an actual trade-mark and not a proposed or intended use, because
proposed or intended use registrations are subject to opposition at any
time by any party able to prove prior use. This could result in significant
devaluation of the asset.
(e)

Industrial Designs

Under section 13( 1) of the IDA, registered or unregistered designs
are assignable, either in whole or part, by an instrument in writing.
Registration is recorded in the Register of Industrial Designs, which is
patt of the Office of the Commissioner of Patents. An exclusive licence
to an industrial design may also be granted and such a licence must be
recorded in the same manner as an assignment. 73 The IDA does not deal
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with the issue of priorities between assignees of registered and unregistered industrial designs, but merely provides for the recording of assignments and licences. As a result, lenders should make the necessary filing
in order to protect their security over the design in question.

(f)

71

73

See ss. 14.1 and 28.2( I) of the Copyright Act.
Trade-marks Act. s. 47(3).
IDA, ss. 13(2) and (3).

Integrated Circuits

Section 7 (I) of the ICTA allows both registered and unregistered
topographies to be transferred, ''either as to the whole interest therein
or as to any undivided portion thereof." A topography may also be part
of the subject-matter of a licence. 74 Neither "transfer" nor "licence" is
defined in the ICTA. As a result, when considering taking security over
a topography, the secured patty should make the necessary filing under
the ICT A to protect its security interest.
The ICTA, like the IDA, merely provides a system for recording
assignments and licences, without dealing in any way with notice or
priority. As a result, lenders should strictly comply with the ICT A in
order to best protect themselves.
(g)

Form of Filings

The form of agreement used by the lender is of fundamental importance in ensuring that security can be enforced under the relevant
federal intellectual property statute. The underlying security agreement
should be drafted as a conditional assignment, because, as noted above,
some of the federal intellectual property statutes explicitly provide for
the registration of transfers or assignment of interests.
The federal intellectual property offices accept and record security
interests in intellectual property as a practical matter, without any express statutory authotity for doing so. 75 Given that this practice is administratively based, it provides lenders with comfort only, not with
legal force. Unless or until the federal intellectual property statutes are
amended to expressly deal with the granting of security interests, the
most effective practice is to make an assignment conditional upon default.
74
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ICTA. s. 7(2).
A note appeared in the Trade-Marks Journal of 8 April 1987 indicating that registration is optional. It provided as follows: "the Registrar of Trade-marks will permit
the placement of security agreements on the files of trade-marks in the circumstances
where such trade-marks have been put up as security."
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FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFLICT (OR PEACEFUL
CO-EXISTENCE)'?

(a)

Introduction: Constitutional Overview

Using intellectual property as collateral depends not only on the
value placed on the property by the lender but also on the ability of the
lender to enforce its security interest against the debtor and third parties,
including a trustee in bankruptcy if necessary. The current federal intellectual property regimes and the provincial personal property security
statutes create certain ambiguities that only future case law or statutory
amendment will ultimately resolve. Some of these ambiguities are reviewed below.
Most of the conflicts between the federal intellectual property legislation and the PPSAs centre on the nature of the interrelationship
existing between the federal recording scheme on the one hand (even
though the CIPO now permits the filing of security agreements) and the
registration of financing statements under the PPSA on the other hand.
The situation calls for caution on the part of lenders: if they wish to
protect their security as thoroughly as possible, they should do so by
drawing on all possibly relevant statutory regimes. This may mean
registering under a PPSA and under the statutes that comprise the federal
intellectual property legislation.
The ambiguities between the two jurisdictions arise as a result of
the somewhat arbitrary nature of the division of powers in Canada. As
previously discussed, the PPSA governs the taking of security interests
in personal property and codifies the rules respecting attachment, perfection and priority in respect of these security interests. The provinces
derive their authority in this area from the prope1ty and civil rights power
under section 92( 13) of the Constitution Act, J867. 76 On the federal side,
Parliament has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over patents and copyrights,77 and has apparently exercised its jurisdiction in enacting the
IDA, the Trade-marks Act and the ICTA under the trade and commerce
power. 78
76

"
7
"

30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.), also reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 ("Constitution Act, 1867").
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(22) and (23) respectively.
Ibid., s. 91 (2). The Privy Council in the Canada Standard Trade-Mark Case, Refer-
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The PPSA does not contain an express provision dealing with
conflicts between it and federal legislation. Section 8(l)(b) of the PPSA
provides that in procedural matters in relation to the enforcement of
rights of a secured patty, the law of the forum prevails. Section 8(2)
suggests that the PPSA will defer to the method of perfection found in
another jurisdiction where the law of that jurisdiction specifies a method
for pedection of a security interest. Unfortunately, with respect to the
federal intellectual property legislation, no method for pe1fection is
expressly stipulated.
Ce1tain federal statutes, including the Bank Act, 79 the Canada Shipping Adm and the Railway Act, 81 contain express provisions dealing with
the creation of security interests. Since each of these statutes has its own
priority scheme in place, McLaren argues that such security interests
will be excluded from the scope of the PPSA unless the secured party
opts to draw on the PPSA. 82 In the event that an argument over priorities

n
"

0

81

82

ence re Dominion Trade & Industry Commission Act, 1935, [ 1937] A.C. 405, [ 1937]
I W.W.R. 333, 67 C.C.C. 342, [1937] I D.L.R. 702 (P.C.), stated in obiter at 417
that Parliament's exercise of regulatory control over and the creation of trade-marks
was within the trade and commerce power confeJTed on Parliament. This power
vested in Parliament was assumed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vapor Canada
Ltd. v. MacDonald, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 and has been upheld in Asbjorn Horgard
AIS v. Gibbs/Nortac Industries Ltd. ( 1987), 3 F.C. 44. B.C.I.P.R. 263 (C.A.). Parliament's jurisdiction over the IDA and the ICTA has not, as yet, been judicially
commented upon: however, it is extremely likely that each statute would be found
to be intra vires Parliament under the trade and commerce power. For a general
overview on the category of the trade and commerce power. see P.W. Hogg. Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Canada, 1997), at 52944.
S.C. 1991, c. 46.
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9. McLaren, supra, note 54, at 1-53 notes an interesting case
decided by the Federal Court, General Motors Acceptance Corp. r>f Canada v.
Furjanic ( 1994), 79 F.T.R. 172, 7 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 52 (T.D.). where the secured party
filed a motion in the Federal Court under the Shipping Act to prohibit the debtor
from dealing with a ship that was subject to a conditional sales agreement. The
secured party had registered a financing statement under the PPSA claiming a
purchase-money security interest in the ship. The court held that the subject-matter
of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and noted
that the secured party's attempt to protect its interest by registering underthe PPSA
did not bar its action in the Federal Court.
R.S.C. 1985, c. R-3, s. 90 [repealed 1996, c. I0, s. 185].
McLaren, supra, note 54. at 1-52. As he points out, in Royal Bank v. Kreiser ( 1986 ).
6 P.P.S.A.C. 292 (Sask. Q.B.). it was held that the Saskatchewan legislature did not
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arises between a security interest created under the PPSA and a security
interest created under one of these specific federal statutes such as the
Shipping Act, there are no statutory priority rules to resolve such a
conflict, as there are under the PPSA. McLaren suggests that such conflicts will be resolved over time only through judicial reasoning.xi
So what is to happen in a situation involving a conflict between a
provincial PPSA and a federal intellectual property statute? How will a
priority dispute between a security interest registered provincially and
an intellectual property assignment registered federally be sorted out?
To take a hypothetical example, what if one creditor claims priority over
a debtor's invention because it registered a financing statement under
the PPSA on 2 July 1997 against all of the personal property of the
debtor, and an assignment under the Patent Act on 5 July 1997, but a
second creditor claims under the Patent Act, having registered an assignment in its favour on 2 July 1997?
A two-stage analysis is required in order to assess federal-provincial
jurisdictional issues. The first is to assess the validity; once the validity
is established, the second step is to check for contradictions under the
paramountcy doctrine. The pai1y claiming priority under federal intellectual prope11y legislation therefore can formulate two separate attacks:
that the PPSA is invalid insofar as it affects federally registered securities, as Saskatchewan has done expressly in its PPSA, 84 or that the PPSA
must succumb to the paramountcy of the federal legislation. Each of
these arguments is explored in brief below.

83

0

-1

have the jurisdiction to terminate a validly created security interest under the federal
statute (section 178 [nows. 427] of the Bank Act).
McLaren, supra, note 54, cites at 1-53 the following cases in support or his conclusion: Rogerson lumber Co. v. Four Seasons Chalet Ltd. ( 1980), I P.P.S.A.C. 160
(Ont. C.A.) which was applied in Bank of Nova Scotia v. International Harl'ester
Credit Corp. (1990). I P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 93 (Ont. C.A.), revg (1987), 7 P.P.S.A.C. I
(H.C.) and Paccar Financial Services Ltd. v. Sinco Trucking Ltd. (Trustee (!f) ( 1987),
7 P.P.S.A.C. 176 (Sask. Q.B.). Presumably. General Motors Acceptance CoqJ. of
Canada v. Furjanic (I 994), 7 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 52 (Fed. T.D.) can be added to this
list for further guidance in this area.
Section 4( I )(c) of Saskatchewan's Personal Property Security Act (sec supra, note
3) reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act or the regulations. this Act does not apply to:
(k) a security agreement govern.:d by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that deals with
the rights of parties to the agreement or the rights of third parties affected by a
security interest created by the agreement, including an agreement governed by
sections 425 to 436 of the Bank Act (Canada).
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Validity

The pith-and-substance doctrine states that one level of government
may enact laws that incidentally affect matters within the competence
of the other level of government. 85 In our hypothetical example, three
main approaches to assessing the validity, or proper legislative impact,
are applicable: singling out, double aspect and presumption of constitutionality with reading down.
Provincial legislation that singles out, or that specifically targets
areas outside valid provincial jurisdiction, can be struck down as an
invalid exercise of provincial power; however, there are many examples
of cases that have not followed this principle. 86 Similarly, a provincial
law that is of general application is not necessarily insulated from judicial
review. In a number of cases, provincial legislation that affected vital
parts of federal enterprises has been held invalid and not to apply to
specific federal entities. 87 Thus, simply relying on the general applicability of the legislation is not an adequate test for determining validity.
The double-aspect doctrine recognizes the complexity of federalprovincial relations by providing for some overlap between the section
91 and 92 division of powers. It simply holds that some matters may
legitimately fall under both federal and provincial heads of government.
In a federal system there are many instances where both levels of government are interested in passing laws on similar topics, even if there
are different policy reasons for doing so. Double aspect applies when
the relative importance of both the provincial and federal components
is similar. 88 For example, in cases involving regulation of traffic, which
occur under both provincial highway traffic codes and the federal criminal law power, 89 and in challenges made to prohibitions against stripping
in taverns, which come under the aegis of both provincial liquor licensing
laws and federal criminal law, both levels of government may wish to
regulate. 9()
See, for example, Ladore v. Bennett, [ 1939] A.C. 468 and Bank of Toronto v. Lambe
(1887), 12 A.C. 575 (P.C.).
86
See Hogg, supra, note 78. at 385-6.
0
See Quebec (Commission du Salaire Minimum) c. Bell Telephone Co., [ 19661 S.C.R.
1
767 ("Quebec Minimum Wage"), reaffirmed in Quebec (Commission de la santi et
de la securitie du travail) v. Bell Canada, [ 1988] I S.C.R. 749.
•• Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [ 1982] 2 S.C.R. I 61. at 18 I.
8
See O'Grady v. Sparling, fl960] S.C.R. 804.
"
9
n See Rio Hotel ltd. v. New Brunswick (Liquor Licensing Board), [I 987] 2 S.C.R. 59.
x;
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Since Quebec Minimum Wage and fr.,,vin Toy Ltd. c. Quebec (Procureur general), 91 provincial laws that either
( l) directly affect a vital part of the management and operation
of a federal undertaking or
(2) indirectly sterilize the undertaking,
are invalid and must be read down to the extent necessary. The difficulty
is determining the dividing line between those cases where provincial
legislation should be read down as affecting a vital core, and those cases
where the provincial law does not affect too greatly federal jurisdiction
because it is, in pith and substance, a valid provincial law. Ci~v National
Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., 92 clarified this position
further by holding that for legislation that encroaches significantly on
the other's jurisdiction, the impugned provision must be essential to the
legislative scheme in order to survive constitutional review; where the
encroachment is less significant, the provision will be valid simply if it
is functionally related to the scheme.'n For example, in General Motors,
at issue was the civil cause of action created under the federal competition law scheme set out in section 31.1 of the Combines Investigation
Act.94 The civil claim did impinge upon provincial jurisdiction under
section 92( 13) propetty and civil rights - but this encroachment was
of little significance to the Act as a whole, and on that finding was held
to be functionally related to a scheme devoted to ensuring a national
policy of competition. In other words, the civil remedies were simply
an adjunct, giving teeth to the overall policy in pa1ticular, isolated instances. Moreover, in all cases, courts will usually presume that any
given law is valid, and that any possible statutory interpretations should
be confined to the jurisdictional competence of the applicable legislature
by reading down if necessary.9 5
'"
''
9

2
·'

94

''

5

[1989] I S.C.R. 927.
[ 1989] I S.C.R. 64 l.
Hogg finds the test altogether too confusing and illogical: see. supra, note 78 at 415.
Nevertheless, the arguments employed here for the PPSA pass either standard.
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 [renamed by R.S.C. 1985. c. 19 (2nd Supp.), s. 19, as the
Competition Act].
Sec Hogg, supra, note 78, at 396-7: sec also McNeil v. Nova Scotia (Board cd·
Censors), [ 1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, at 687-8: Derrickson v. Derrickson, [ 1986] I S.C.R.
285; Manitoba. v. Air Canada. [ 1980] 2 S.C.R. 303.
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Both the federal intellectual property legislation and the respective
provincial PPSAs are valid under their own jurisdictions and, if challenged, would not fail the first part of the test. The federal intellectual
property statutes are clearly enacted under specific federal heads of
power. 96 Conversely, the Ontario PPSA, for example, is a law of general
application, operating as a general secmity statute for use by individuals
and both federal and provincial entities, and is essentially concerned
with property and civil rights in a province. It is a single legislative
scheme; its leading feature (its pith and substance or matter) is to rationalize a system for the regulation of personal property security transactions, and for making it publicly registrable so as to allow creditors and
debtors to function more knowledgeably. The most that could be said is
that security provisions under PPSA legislation and the registration
provisions under the federal intellectual prope1ty statutes have a double
aspect to them. The provincial schemes are important for organizing and
safeguarding valid provincial goals related to propetty and civil rights,
whereas federal Parliament maintains an interest in allowing a comprehensive intellectual property regime, patt of which should include assignment rights and acknowledgment of third-party rights in property.
The central issue here is whether the security registration system
as found in the PPSA affects a vital or essential part of the federal
intellectual property legislation, or conversely, whether the interests that
may be created under the recordal schemes of the various federal intellectual property statutes affect the vital core of the PPSA. The two seem
to have completely different purposes and essential natures. The vital
part of federal intellectual property legislation is to ensure a system of
registration and protection of rights of property ownership in invention
and ingenuity; each of the Acts gives incentive to human creativity in a
market economy. PPSA legislation, on the other hand, provides a system
of public notification for various property interests, and protects security
rights among creditors by prioritizing claims. As compared with its
predecessor, chattel security law, it is characterized by its "stmctural
integration, conceptual unity, comprehensiveness, legal predictability,
accommodation, and detailed regulation of default rights and reme96

See Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91. This is express for patents and copyright and
implied for trade-marks, industrial designs and integrated circuits. See supra, notes
76 to 78 and accompanying text.
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dies. " 97 It is a scheme of organizing and classifying that applies post
hoc, and has little relevance to the creative spirit, or incentive to invent.
Moreover, as the effect on federal heads of power is incidental or indirect
because PPSA legislation regulates creditors' and debtors' rights, not
intellectual property per se, neither is the more stringent "sterilization"
breached. 98 Therefore, rather than the provisions of either the PPSA or
the federal intellectual property statutes being struck down on the basis
of invalidity or improper encroachment, the more likely scenario, in
cases of conflict, is to turn to the doctrine of paramountcy for relief.
(ii)

Paramountcy

Federal paramountcy doctrine holds that where there are inconsistent or conflicting federal and provincial laws, and both are valid, the
federal law prevails. It is therefore a secondary test to be resorted to
once validity is established under the characterization tests outlined
above. Professor Hogg has described three different types of inconsistency that fall under the rubric of paramountcy: express contradiction,
negative implication and overlap.99 Each relies on slightly different
standards of analysis. Where there is express contradiction, so that it is
impossible to comply with both the federal and provincial law at the
same time, the federal law prevails.
On the other hand, a provincial law that merely supplements a
federal Jaw without expressly contradicting it is not deemed to be inconsistent, and the paramountcy doctrine is inapplicable. As opposed to
the American situation, where once the federal government has legislated in an area, a negative implication is drawn that precludes further
state legislation, HX) the Canadian system allows for more co-operative
'

17

HIGH TECH LENDING

l 14 B.F.L.R.]

See J.S. Ziegel. R.C.C. Cuming. Secured Transactions in Persona! Property. Suretyships and Insolvency. (Vol. Ill of Commercial and Consumer Transactions: Cases,
Text and Materials by J.S. Ziegel. B. Geva and R.C.C. Cuming) (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications. 1995). at 16.
'" See Gibson, '·Comment", (1990). 69 Cdn. Bar Rev. 339. for criticism of the
''relaxed" test. Also, Hogg, supra, note 78. at 405.
'''' Ibid .. at 423-41.
""' Referred to as the rule of pre-emption. See Hines i'. Davidowitz. 312 U.S. 52 ( 1941 );
Pennsylvania 1•. Nelson. 359 U.S. 497 ( 1956). Sec also. ''Note: ··occupation of the
Field' in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-46; Ten Years of Federalism·· ( 1946), 60
Harv. L. Rev. 262.
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regulation between levels of government. In 0 'Grady the Supreme Comt
found that there is no doctrine of "covering the field" in Canada, and
that legislation from both levels of government, if not contradictory, can
operate concurrently. It may even be that one law is stricter than the
other; in such a case, one must comply with the stricter or face possible
liability. 101 Finally, where the federal and provincial laws are equivalent,
the paramountcy doctrine does not apply.
The end result of this interplay between jurisdictions means that
only where there is a direct contradiction, as in the hypothetical example
given at the beginning of this section, does the doctrine apply by altering
legislative effects. Since under the first stage of analysis - the validity
stage - both the PPSA and the federal intellectual prope1ty statutes were
determined to be valid exercises of legislative power, both remain intact.
In the hypothetical, where different priorities exist between the two
schemes because of specific facts, the provincial PPSA legislation would
not be struck down, but simply held inoperable to the extent of such an
inconsistency. In other words, where federal and provincial laws stipulate a different order of priority for paying debts, the federal interest
must govern. 102 Only in a specific case where the facts give rise to such
a direct contradiction would a constitutional issue arise.
As has been advocated throughout this article, the most prudent
course for creditors is to register security interests or assignments under
both regimes wherever possible. Interestingly, there is much more extensive judicial (albeit inconsistent) comment on the interaction between
federal intellectual property regimes and the UCC in the United States.'°'
Some of this discussion may be relevant in guiding Canadian jurisprudence in this area; therefore, in the following analysis, American case
law will be referred to where appropriate.
101

102

101

See O'Grady, supra, note 89; also R. \'.Mann, [1966] S.C.R. 238; Bell v. Prince
Edward Island (Attorney Genera[) ( 1973), [ 1975] I S.C.R. 25; Construction Montcalm Inc. i>. Quebec (Minimum Wage Commission). ( 1978), [ 1979] I S.C.R. 754;
McCutcheon, supra, note 88. See also. Hogg. supra, note 78, at 430ff
The situation has occurred in Canada and been resolved in favour of the federal
priority: see Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue, [ 1928] A.C. I 87; Bozanich Re. [ 1942]
S.C.R. 130; Ontario (Auorney General) v. Wentworth Insurance Co., [ 1969] S.C.R.
779.
See, infra, secs. 5(b) through 5(d).
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The interplay between the Patent Act and the PPSA is underdeveloped in this country. Seven decades ago, in Colpitts v. Sherwood, 104 the
Alberta Court of Appeal held that the reference to "every assignment"
in then section 30 of the Pateni Act (now section 51, with minor modifications) included assignments intended as security and, as such, were
registrable under the Patent Act. This remains the only case on point.
The facts of Colpitts are straightforward: the assignee of a patent, in
return for a loan of $2,000, granted an option to an interested third party
to pay $5,000 for an undivided 50% interest in the patent. At the same
time as entering into this option agreement, the assignee negotiated a
financing arrangement with Colpitts to borrow $8,000 from him and
provide him with an assignment of the patent as security for the repayment of the loan. Subsequently, the assignee defaulted and Colpitts
attempted to register the assignment with the patent office. It was then
discovered that the third party optionee had exercised his option to
acquire the 50% interest in the patent without payment of the $5,000 fee
and had already registered the assignment under the Patent Act.
The Alberta Court of Appeal found that all of the parties involved
were aware of the respective agreements. Since the optionee had not
paid the $5,000 when he exercised the option, the court concluded that
he had committed a fraud upon Colpitts. The assignment to the optionee
was set aside, although he was given an opportunity to acquire the
half-interest on payment of the $5,000 to Colpitts.
It appears that the Court of Appeal read into section 30 of the Patent
Act the requirement that both the prior and subsequent assignee must be
unaware of the other's assignment. This interpretation is difficult to
sustain. How, for example, might this reasoning apply to a situation
where the first assignee, only after registering, became aware of a subsequent assignment? That from the outset the first assignee in Colpitts
was aware of the second assignee must have been the reason that allowed
the court to conclude as it did. In any event, the holding is at best curious,
and at worst wrong. To rely on this decision as authority for the proposition that an assignment by way of security is subject to the provisions
of sections 50 and 51 of the Patent Act is somewhat optimistic and
w4

Colpitts v. Sherwood, [1927] 3 D.L.R. 7. (Alta. C.A.).
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possibly ill-conceived, especially in the light of American case law on
this point. 105
American courts, in interpreting language similar to that in the
Patent Act, have held that where a security interest taken in a patent falls
short of constituting an absolute assignment, the United States Patent
ActHlb does not require a registration to be made under that legislation. 107
A UCC filing will be sufficient to perfect a lender's security interest in
a patent. In other words, the UCC will fill in the gaps where the federal
legislation does not expressly provide for the taking of a security interest
in a specified manner. If Congress intended to create an all-inclusive
federal security regime for patents, it would have expressly said so in
the legislation.
Despite the Alberta Court of Appeal's conclusion that the Patent
Act permits security assignments, the ambiguity in the precise meaning
of "assignment" under the Patent Act means that Canadian lenders
should exercise caution. Any security agreement that charges a patent,
a family of patents, or any pending applications or licence(s) that are
related 108 should be registered under the Patent Act (preferably in a free
standing document) in addition to the usual registration under the PPSA.
The underlying security agreement should be structured so as to resemble
ws
to(>

107

108

See Zimmerman, Bertrand and Dunlop, supra, note 42, at 92.
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §261(West1984).
In Waterman v. McKen-::.ie, 138 U.S. 252 ( 1891 ), the United States Supreme Court
recognized that there were only two instances where registration under the federal
act would be required in the case of patents - namely, in respect of licences and
assignments. In Holt v. United States, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 336 (D.D.C.
1973), it was noted that only assignments involving secu1ity interests would have
to be registered under the federal statute in order to be perfected. A more recent
case in this area, In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 633, 40
U.C.C. Rep. (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985), involved a financing statement filed under
the UCC. No assignment was recorded at the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO"). Upon the debtor's bankruptcy, the trustee argued that the
secured party's security interest in the patents was unperfected, since it had failed
to make a filing at the federal office. The court disagreed. Notwithstanding that the
security interest was an "assignment, grant or conveyance". the trustee was neither
a purchaser nor a mortgagee. For a thorough analysis of the Waterman, Holt and
Transportation Design decisions, see MacLellan, "Security Interests in Intellectual
Property" (1992), 22 Golden Gate U. L.R. 413.
Section 90 of the Patent Rules (enacted under the Patent Act) even contemplates an
assignment of a pending application for a patent, which can obviously be of significant value to a creditor for security purposes: see SOR/96-423, s. 90.
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an assignment conditional upon default. J(JlJ In these cases, the creditor
would then file the agreement under the Patent Act and release any and
all claim or entitlement to the patent(s) or patent application(s), as the
case may be, once the debtor's obligations have been fully satisfied.
Conservative creditors usually attempt to bring their transactions
wholly within the filing requirements of the Patent Act (given the national scope of such registrations), while at the same time doing all that
is required to perfect their security under the PPSA. Since the Canadian
Intellectual Property Office accepts assignments intended as security
(whether they are drafted as assignments, conditional upon default assignments, security agreements, and so on) for registration under section
50(2) of the Patent Act, the confusion in this area of law means simply
that caution should be exercised by duplicate registrations.
(c)

The Copyright Act and the PPSA

As with patents, it is unclear whether the assignment provisions of
the Copyright Act apply to security assignments. As a result, it is recommended that lenders use both the PPSA and the Copyright Act to
perfect and protect security over copyrights. A financing statement
should be registered under the PPSA. In order to obtain the most satisfactory result, the security agreement should then be strnctured as an
assignment conditional on default by the debtor, which can then be
registered under the Copyright Act. The issue of priority, however,
remains to be resolved.
The Federal Court in Poolman v. Eiffel Productions S.A. 110 dealt
with the issue of validation of a security assignment involving copyright.
109

The security agreement ultimately used could contain such negative covenant
clauses as:
( l) a covenant not to fm1her encumber any of its interest in or benefit of the patent rights.
so long as the agreement remains in force, withom the prior written consent of the
lender; and
(2) a covenant to agree, at the request of the lender. to execute all fmthcr matters as may
he required by the lender related to the patent rights that are necessary to give cfkct
to the exercise of the powers of the lender.

110

This language could be further augmented by having the borrower agree in advance
that after the occurrence of an event of default, the borrower will appoint any officer
of the lender as attorney of the borrower. and will vest such lender appointee with
full power of substitution to execute such matters as the borrower has agreed to give
effect to, with the right to use the name of the borrower.
( 1991 ), 35 C.P.R. (3d) 384 (Fed. T.D.).
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The court held that mere registration of an assignment under the Copyright Act did not create a right that would supersede the result dictated
by provincial law. The holding in Poolman might suggest that Canadian
courts, particularly in the case of security assignments, will employ the
PPSA in deciding issues of priority among competing assignments.
The American experience, however, is different. The leading American case, National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loans
Association, 111 held that in order to perfect a security interest in a registered copyright, a registration must be made under the applicable
federal copyright legislation 112 and not under the UCC. In that case, the
principal assets of National Peregrine, Inc. ("NPI") consisted of a library of copyrights, distribution rights and licences to some 145 films,
and accounts receivable arising from the licensing of these films. In
June, 1985, Capitol Federal Savings & Loan of Denver ("Cap Fed")
extended a $6 million line of credit to NPI, secured by its film library
and receivables. Both the security agreement and the financing statement
were properly filed under the UCC by Cap Fed and expressly included
"general intangibles" in the description of the collateral. No filing was
made at the United States Copyright Office. After NPI made a chapter
11 1n filing in 1989, it sought to set aside as unperfected Cap Fed's
security interest in the copyrights and related receivables, claiming, inter
alia, that Cap Fed was required to file its security interest with the federal
copyright office and that failure to do so permitted NPI to retain these
assets. Cap Fed argued the copy1ights and receivables were "general
intangibles" recognized under article 9-106 of the UCC and that it had
properly perfected its security interest when the financing statement was
filed.
The federal District Court found that the federal statute occupied
the field with respect to copyright collateral and that the UCC filings
against the copyrights as "general intangibles" were a nullity. As such,
the UCC was pre-empted when it came to copyrights.
Public policy concerns seemed to be the focus of the com1' s analysis
in Peregrine Entertainment. These included: the need for a single lo111

16 U.S.P.Q. (2d) 1017, 116 B.R. 194, 11 U.C.C. Rep. (2d) 1025 (Cal. Dis. Fed. Ct)
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("Peregrine Entertainment").
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 205 (Supp. lll 1991) ("U.S. Copyright Act").
Chapter 11 filings under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 301.
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cation where third-pat1y searchers could go to determine whether the
debtor's intellectual property had been encumbered; the specific and
separate scheme for determining priority among conflicting transferees
established by the Copyright Act; and the express provision of at1icle
9-302(3)(a) of the UCC, which provided that filings were not necessary
to perfect a security interest where a system of national or international
registration was in place.
Peregrine Entertainment has not clarified this area of law, however,
as commentators disagree on the appropriate way to take security interests in copyrights. Some would support the theory that there has been
complete pre-emption by the federal legislation over copyrights, while
others support the opposite theory. 114 A more pragmatic view would be
to characterize the federal law as governing priority of copyright ownership in respect of assignments among assignees and the UCC as governing the registration and priority of other security interests.
This interpretation makes sense for Canada, especially since registration under the Copyright Act of a copyright or an interest therein is
not compulsory, and since there is no constitutional doctrine of preemption in Canada as there is in the United States. In order to preserve
a secured party's security interest in and over a copyright, then, it is
arguable that there is still room for a PPSA registration. On this basis,
creditors taking security over copyrights should use the Copyright Act
in order to protect their positions, while not forgetting to register under
the PPSA. Only in the case of an express contradiction will the federal
legislation render the provincial PPSA inoperable.

(d)

The Trade-marks Act and the PPSA

The Trade-marks Act provides for the non-compulsory registration
of a trade-mark pursuant to section 48. The registration of trade-mark
assignments is also provided for in the same section. Since the Trademarks Act refers to assignments and not to security interests in general,
114

See J. Lam, "Banking on a Dream: Perfecting Security Interests in Copyrights''
( 1993), 13 Loyola of L.A. Ent. L.J. 319, at 333. See, as well, the recent decision
reached in Re Avalon Sofiware, Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997), where
the court held that the proceeds of sale derived from copyrightable materials and a
security interest in such materials will be unperfectcd if filed or recorded anywhere
other than at the United States Copyright Office.
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it is arguable that only a security assignment that actually passes ownership of the trade-mark to the creditor needs to be registered under the
federal statute.
As with patents and copyrights, one method for taking a security
interest in a trade-mark is to take an assignment that is conditional upon
default and register it under the federal legislation. The debtor in such
cases will be obligated to assign the trade-mark to the secured pat1y in
the event of default. This approach should not pre-empt the registration
of a financing statement in respect of the same trade-mark under the
PPSA.
Judicial opinion in the United States is mixed on whether the registration of a security interest in trade-marks is pre-empted by registration under the applicable federal statute. Under the Peregrine Entertainment line of reasoning, one would expect there to be no room for a
PPSA-like security registration under any federal regime that provides
for the registration of assignments. However, at least two American
cases dealing specifically with trade-marks have shown a clear willingness to recognize the non-exclusive nature of the federal Lanham Act' 15
governing trade-marks in the United States.
In Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 116 the Sixth Circuit
held that the wording of the federal statute was not sufficient to protect
registrants who file security interests only at the federal level. Such
exclusivity, the court maintained, would have to be expressed clearly in
the legislation before it could make a determination of preemption.
In Re TR-3 Industries, 117 the issue was whether a bank had perfected
a security interest in the trade-mark "TR-3" as part of a floating lien
covering "all general intangibles" of the debtor. The bank filed a financing statement under the UCC but made no security assignment filing
in the USPTO. The unsecured creditors' committee in the chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings of the debtor argued that the Lanham Act required the security assignment of the trade-mark to be filed in the
USPTO. The court found otherwise. It concluded that the Lanham Act
contained no statutory provision for the registration of any instrument
115
11

"
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Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § I060.
43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984). affd 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
41 B.R. 128, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 279 (Bankr. CD Cal. 1984).
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or document assetting a security interest in a trade-mark. If Congress
had intended there to be such exclusive powers, it would have provided
for such a method of perfecting security interests in trade-marks or
provided a method of giving constructive notice of such interests. Therefore, the transaction was not excluded from article 9 of the UCC, with
the result that the bank's filed financing statement was allowed to govern.
Again, because there is no constitutional doctrine of pre-emption
in Canada, the PPSA will likely cover a secured party's interest over
trade-marks absent an express contradiction. Given the lack of a proper
registration and priority scheme under the Trade-marks Act, it is of even
greater importance for creditors to ensure that a PPSA registration and
requisite acknowledgment are obtained.
(e)

Summary 118

The wording found in much of the Canadian federal intellectual
property legislation regarding security of assets is strikingly similar to
that in the United States. In each of the Patent Act, the Copyright Act
and the Trade-marks Act, the language creates an uneasy relationship
with the PPSA. American legislation and case law in this area reveal the
existence of similar tensions, despite the existence in the United States
of a "covering the field" doctrine that seems to heavily favour federal
initiatives. As a result, Canadian lenders faced with taking security over
intellectual property assets should, especially where such assets make
up a significant proportion of the borrower's asset base, do all that is
necessary to comply with both the PPSA and the relevant federal regimes.

6.

CONCLUSION
It is a hallmark of the cautious conservatism of the legal profession that the
dilemma of choice was usually resolved by registering under both Acts. It recalled
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to me the sage advice of one of my law professors who counselled wearing
suspenders as well as a belt so as not to get caught with your pants down. 11 "

This article has not resolved all issues inherent in securing intellectual propetty assets. Given Canada's federal structure, that goal may not
be possible, because, as Zimmerman, Bertrand and Dunlop state, "the
current legislative schemes in Canada do not easily facilitate the taking
of security in intellectual property.'' 120 Although the PPSA provides for
the creation and perfection of security interests in intellectual property,
the federal intellectual prope1ty legislation does not expressly address
this issue at all. This jurisdictional incongruity creates a situation where
lenders and their counsel are left struggling to find a level of comfort
under both legislative schemes. As a result, many issues remain unresolved and will only be effectively dealt with by future legislative
amendment or judicial comment.
One possible solution to this jurisdictional quagmire may be to
create a single federal register that deals solely with intellectual property. 121 In order for this system to work, however, statutory reform that
sorts out the priorities between competing interests would be required.
In the meantime, current structures do protect lenders who advance
moneys in the intellectual property environment, as long as they employ
an extra dose of caution. Initial prudence is required to be aware of those
considerations that do not typically arise in more traditional types of
secured financing transactions. More important, where many legal issues
remain unresolved, it is imperative that lenders ensure that they ultimately obtain exigible and saleable bundles of rights, including not only
the intellectual property but also the tangible products that are derived
from and are embodied within such rights.

11

''

120
121

""

With regard to both the ICTA and the IDA. many (if not all) of the same issues
raised previously in this section exist vis-a-vis the PPSA, so will not be discussed
further. In any case, there arc no reported decisions relating to these statutes and the
PPSA, and the practical advice given for the other intellectual property regimes
would be similar.
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Zimmerman, Bertrand and Dunlop, supra, note 42, at 122.
Jn fact, the National Intellectual Property Section of the Canadian Bar Association
created an ad hoc committee on security interests in intellectual property. which
proposed a federal intellectual property security act modelled after the PPSA. Unfortunately, the proposal soon died and the committee is currently inactive. It is
hoped that legislation of this nature will ultimately be adopted, although passage is
obviously now some time away.

